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We report experimental evidence on second-movers’ behavior in the in-
vestment game (also known as the trust game) when there exists endowment
heterogeneity. Using a within-subject analysis, we investigate whether second-
movers have a tendency to be reciprocal (i.e., they return to first movers at
least what they have received from them), or exhibit some taste for inequal-
ity aversion (i.e., they return a larger (smaller) share of the available funds
to first-movers who are initially endowed with a lesser (larger) endowment,
respectively). Our results suggest that second-movers’ behavior is consistent
across distribution of endowments, what indicates that second-movers (on av-
erage) do not take into consideration the level of endowments when making
their decisions. This finding, in turn, implies that subjects behave according to
our definition of reciprocity and that inequality-aversion receives little support
from our data.
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1 Introduction
Models of inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ock-
enfels 2000) have emerged as a useful tool for reconciling observed behavior
in laboratory experiments with the standard assumption that individuals care
only about their own material payo↵s. Although intuitively attractive and
capable of predicting behavior in many di↵erent settings, inequality aversion
may sometimes be in conflict with other behavioral motives such as reciprocity
(Cox 2004, Bereby-Meyer and Niederle 2005, Ciriolo 2007, Xiao and Bicchieri
2010). For example, if we look at the investment game (also known as the
trust game) in Berg et al. (1995) and assume that subjects di↵er in their ini-
tial endowments, if the unequal distribution of endowments is in favor of the
first-mover (hereafter, the investor, she) reciprocal behavior from the second-
mover (hereafter, the allocator, he) may in fact induce more inequality. This
type of situation is studied in Xiao and Bicchieri (2010), who show that allo-
cators have a tendency not to pay back if doing so would increase inequality.
Arguably, the allocator’s decision can also reduce payo↵ inequality when his
endowment is larger than the investor’s. In that case, returning a large share
of the available funds would lessen the di↵erence in final payo↵s. This may
not necessarily be interpreted as reciprocal behavior but rather as a choice in
pursuit of equality (i.e., allocators may dislike that their payo↵s are ahead).
In this paper we use a within-subject design to investigate how alloca-
tors reciprocate the investors’ decision when there is endowment heterogene-
ity. More specifically, we want to study whether (and how) allocators take into
consideration di↵erences in endowments when making their decision about the
share of the available funds that they want to return.1
We consider that two driving forces may explain the allocator’s behavior.
The first, reciprocity, refers in our context to the allocator’s willingness to
pay back what he has received from the investor (see Coleman 1990, Ciriolo
2007). This, in turn, implies that reciprocity alone could not explain any e↵ect
of initial distributions on behavior, as reciprocal allocators should return the
1Hereafter, di↵erences in endowments refer to di↵erences in the amount that subjects receive
in the experiment; i.e., we do not study any pre-existing di↵erences in wealth.
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same proportion of the surplus generated regardless of the level of endowments.
As for second behavioral explanation, inequality-aversion, we consider that
allocators may want to reduce the di↵erence in final payo↵s, so that they will
return a higher share when investors are at a relative disadvantage with regard
to the initial distribution of endowments, compared with the case in which they
are at a relative advantage.
Our definitions of reciprocity and inequality aversion yield two clear-cut
predictions of allocators’ behavior depending on whether changing the initial
distribution of endowments in our game a↵ect the allocator’s choices. We test
these predictions using the behavioral data in Calabuig et al. (2013). Our data
suggest that allocators make a division of the surplus generated that is consis-
tent across the di↵erent distribution of endowments.2 On average, allocators
do not tend to compensate investors who are in a position of disadvantage
with regard to the initial level of endowments, nor do they tend to keep a
larger fraction of the available funds when they are in a disadvantage posi-
tion. Allocators seem to return what they have received without accounting
for di↵erences in the initial endowments. These findings indicate that on aver-
age allocators are motivated by reciprocity rather than by a desire to equalize
final payo↵s.
Our paper is not the only paper that attempts to test inequality-aversion.
Some evidence exists that subjects have a taste for egalitarian outcomes (e.g.,
Dawes et al. 2007, Korenok et al. 2012), although the idea of inequality aver-
sion is sometimes rejected (e.g., Bereby-Meyer and Niederle 2005, Filippin and
Raimondi 2014), especially when it is tested against other behavioral motives,
such as e ciency (Kritikos and Bolle, 2001, Engelmann and Strobel 2004) or
impure altruism (Chowdhury and Jeon, 2014). In the case of the investment
game, some studies attempt to disentangle the di↵erent motives behind trust
and reciprocity. These include the work of Cox (2004) or Ashraf et al. (2006)
who assess the role of intentions, and investigate the importance of altruism
and expectations on behavior (see also Fehr and Schmidt 2002, McCabe et al.
2Other behavioral motives, such as selfishness, are also possible and would predict no e↵ect of
initial endowments in the allocator’s behavior. We should also account and test for this behavior.
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2003, Cox et al. 2014). To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no di-
rect test for inequality aversion in the investment game when the endowment of
the investor and the allocator are systematically varied across di↵erent rounds
of the experiment.3 The closest paper to ours is Xiao and Bicchieri (2010),
who compare allocators’ behavior in a symmetric situation (where investors
and allocators receive the same endowment), with behavior in an asymmetric
situation (where allocators are given a lesser endowment). Besides some note-
worthy di↵erences in experimental design (e.g., they employ a between-subject
analysis and constraint the investor’s decision to be a binary choice) we also
make allocators play with a higher endowment, so that we can test whether
they are more willing to pay back if their action reduces inequality.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the concepts of reciprocity and inequality aversion that we use in the paper,
and we derive the two behavioral hypotheses that we test in our experiment.
We outline our experimental design in Section 3. Our results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 On the role of reciprocity and inequality-
aversion in the investment game
Consider the investment game in Berg et al. (1995), where the investor (subject
i) and the allocator (subject a) are assumed to be endowed with ei   0 and
3Other experiments that investigate investors’ behavior in the presence of endowment hetero-
geneity include Glaeser et al. (2000), Anderson et al. (2006) or Greiner et al. (2007). In all these
papers, the allocators’ behavior (and, more specifically, the study of inequality versus reciprocity)
is disregarded. The relevance of inequality aversion and reciprocity has also been studied in other
games, such as the gift-exchange game (Falk et al. 2008) or the moonlighting game (Charness
and Haruvy, 2002). See Charness and Shmidov (2014) for a recent review of the di↵erent games
that have been used to elicit reciprocal motives.
4Another important di↵erence relies on our definition of reciprocity. We ask allocators to
return what they have received from investors for them to be considered as reciprocal. According
to Xiao and Bicchieri (2010), any positive return from investors to allocators is interpreted as
evidence in favor of reciprocity.
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ea   0, respectively. In the first stage of the game, the investor has to decide
the amount X in [0, ei] that she wants to send to the allocator. The allocator
receives 3X and has to decide the percentage y in [0, 1] of the available funds
(3X) that he wants to return. The subjects’ final payo↵s in the game are
computed as follows:
⇡i(ei, X, y) := ei +X(3y   1)   0
⇡a(ea, X, y) := ea + 3X(1  y)   0
Transfers between the investor and the allocator have been usually inter-
preted as evidence in favor of trust and trustworthiness (see Eckel and Wilson
2011, Johnson and Mislin 2011, Cooper and Kagel, 2013 for a review of the
results). Our aim in this paper is to tease apart two plausible explanations for
the allocator’s behavior: reciprocity and inequality aversion.
We follow Coleman (1990) and Ciriolo (2007) and assume that reciprocity
is fulfilled as long as the investor is not worse o↵ than if she sent nothing;
i.e., the investor should retrieve at least what she sent for the allocator to be
defined as reciprocal.5 Because we need the investor’s payo↵ ⇡i(ei, X, y) to
not fall behind her initial endowment, a minimum requirement for reciprocity
is that the allocator returns a proportion y = 1/3 of the available funds.
Interestingly, this implies that the reciprocal allocator should return a fixed
proportion of the available funds, regardless of the amount that he received
from the investor. In our experiment, we shall use two di↵erent level of the
endowments ek 2 {10, 40} for k = i, a. As a behavioral prediction, our concept
of reciprocity implies that these values should play no role in the allocator’s
decision.
Reciprocity If the allocator is reciprocal, he will return a share of the available
funds that will not be a↵ected by the level of endowments (ei, ea), that is,
y40,10 = y40,40 = y10,10 = y10,40
One may argue, however, that inequality aversion may be an important mo-
tivation at stake. When the investor and the allocator di↵er in their initial
5Other models of reciprocal preferences include Rabin (1993), Charness and Rabin (2002),
McCabe et al. (2003), Cox (2004), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) and Cox et al. (2007).
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endowment, the allocator may want to equalize payo↵s (Ciriolo 2007, Xiao
and Bicchieri 2010). To build upon this possibility, we can consider that the
allocator su↵ers a cost if his final payo↵ di↵er from the investor’s one (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In particular, we can




⇡a(ea, X, y)  ↵
2
(⇡a(ea, X, y)  ⇡i(ei, X, y))2
If we take derivatives, we can see that the allocator should return a pro-
portion of the available funds y 2 [0, 1] that takes into account both the
amount that he receives from the investor (X) and the level of endowments.
More specifically, the larger the di↵erence between the allocator and the in-
vestor’s endowment (ea   ei) the larger the share of the available funds that
an inequality-averse allocator should return.6 This, in turn, translates into the
following behavioral prediction when we consider the two di↵erent level of the
endowments ek 2 {10, 40} for k = i, a that are used in our experiment.
Inequality-aversion If the allocator is inequality-averse, he will return a
share of the available funds that will be a↵ected by the level of endowments
(ei, ea), and the larger the di↵erence between the allocator and the investor’s
payo↵s (ea   ei) the more he will return, that is,
y40,10 < y40,40 = y10,10 < y10,40
One aspect that is worth mentioning is that our concept of reciprocity im-
plies not only that the return will be consistent across level of endowments
but also that allocators will return (at least) one third of the available funds
6For this particular case, the optimal return is given by y⇤ = 23 +
ea ei
6X   112↵X , where ↵ > 0
indicates the extent to which allocators account for inequality in the final payo↵s. If ↵ = 0 then
the allocator can be said to be self-interested and the optimal return will be given by y⇤ = 0).
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regardless of the distribution of endowments.7 As for inequality aversion, the
prediction for any particular distribution of endowments will depend on the
utility function that we assume for allocators (i.e., the value of ↵). A plausi-
ble assumption is to consider that allocators want to equalize payo↵s up to a
point ; i.e., ↵ > 0 but not su ciently high so as to make ⇡a(ea, X, y) equals
to ⇡i(ei, X, y) an optimal decision. In that were the case, we should expect
a positive correlation between the amount sent (X) and the proportion re-
turned (y) in the distribution (40,10). This is because for small transfers X,
the allocator will tend to keep a high proportion of the available funds so as
to restore equality. When the amount sent is su ciently high, the allocator
can restore equality by keeping a smaller proportion of the available funds, so
a higher return would be expected. Similarly, a negative correlation between
X and y may be expected in the (10,40) distribution. The allocator will tend
to return nothing when he receives an small X, but he will tend to return a
higher proportion of the available funds as X increases.
Arguably, we may also follow Ciriolo (2007) and assume that ↵ is suf-
ficiently high so that the inequality-averse allocator would want to equalize
payo↵s. If that were the case, allocators should return 2/3 of the available
funds in the absence of endowment heterogeneity (i.e., when ea = ei). This is
to keep the final distribution of payo↵s equals, as it was the initial distribution
of endowments. By the same token, the inequality averse allocator that wants
to equalize final payo↵s should return the entire available funds in (10,40).
In that distribution, even if the allocator returns y = 1, he will be unable
to equalize payo↵s, despite the di↵erence between ⇡a(ea, X, y) and ⇡i(ei, X, y)
would be minimized.8
Although we may want to test these behavioral predictions (e.g., we can
7Trivially, a selfish allocator would return nothing in all distributions, what would be con-
sistent with the hypothesis for reciprocity unless we require that allocators return (at least) one
third of the available surplus.
8Appendix A presents these predictions in detail. In Figure 1A we depict the predictions of
inequality aversion for each possible distribution of endowments. We show how the predictions
are a↵ected by the value of ↵ > 0 in Figure 2A. This includes a discussion on the expected corre-
lation between the amount sent and the proportion returned in each distribution of endowments.
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investigate if allocators are motivated to restore strict equality and return y =
2/3 in the absence of endowment heterogeneity, or if they return y = 1 in the
distribution (10,40)), our goal is not to study whether reciprocity or inequality
aversion can explain behavior for a particular distribution of endowments.
Instead, we want to see whether any of these two behavioral motives can be
reconciled with our data when we change the distribution of endowments. In
that regard we note that the extent to which allocators react to changes in the
endowments determine therefore if they are reciprocal or inequality averse.
While reciprocity predicts no e↵ect at all, inequality aversion predicts a larger
return when the investor’s endowment is low.
3 Experimental Design
We use the behavioral data in Calabuig et al (2013) to test our predictions.
Calabuig et al (2013) recruited a total of 96 subjects to participate in a comput-
erized experiment run at LINEEX (Universidad de Valencia). Their objective
was to investigate the e↵ects of punishment on trust behavior using a within-
subject design, therefore two di↵erent treatments were considered: one with
punishment and another one without punishment.
At the beginning of each session, instructions (read-aloud) informed sub-
jects that they would be assigned a role (investor or allocator) to be kept
during the entire session. Each session consisted of a total of 8 rounds: 4 with
punishment and 4 without punishment. Treatments were randomized so that
in half of the sessions the rounds with (without) punishment went first.9 In
what follows, we describe the experimental design and the procedures for the
case without punishment, which corresponds to the data we use the current
paper.
Each subject received an endowment at the beginning of each round that
could be either 10 or 40 tokens. Subjects made a total of 4 decisions, one for
9At the end of the experiment, one of the two treatments was selected for the payment. The
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test suggests that allocators’ behavior is invariant to the
order in which treatments were implement (Z = 1.084, p-value = 0.278).
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each distribution of endowments (ei, ea) 2 {(40, 10), (10, 10), (40, 40), (10, 40)}.
They went though the entire sequence by the end of the experiment, but we
control for the order in which distributions were played so that subjects did
not play the distributions in the same order. More specifically, some subjects
start playing the distribution (40,10) and then moved to (10,10), (40,40) or
(10,40), whereas some other players started with (10,10) and then moved to
(40,10), (40,40) or (10,40). We balance the order in which each sequence was
played so as to minimize the possible influence on behavior of the order in
which distributions were played. We also minimize the possibility of subjects
smoothing out incentives across distributions by not informing them that they
would play the four distributions of endowments. It was common information
that the amount that they would get in a particular round would not need
to coincide with the amount received by the other player. Before making
their decisions, however, investors and allocators were informed about the
distribution of endowments for that round.
After each round, subjects received information about their own decision
and the one of their partner before being re-matched. As for the matching
protocol, subjects interacted with other each other using a perfect-stranger
protocol. In particular, subjects were told that would meet with a di↵erent
subject in each round, and would never play with the same subject twice. This
was implemented by considering matching groups. Each session consisted of
24 subjects, divided in 3 groups of 8 subjects. Within each group, 4 subjects
were randomly assigned the role of investors and 4 subjects were assigned the
role of allocators. Subjects interacted with other members of their matching-
group, and subjects from di↵erent groups never interacted with each other
throughout the session.
Subjects received on average 15 Euros for participating in the experiment,
which lasted around 90 minutes. Appendix B contains a translated version of
the original instructions. This includes screenshots of the experiment and a




We summarize the data in Table 1. Panel A presents the decision of the
48 investors for each possible distribution of endowments. The allocators’
behavior is summarized in Panel B.10 We report the correlation between the
investor’s transfer (X) and the allocator’s returned share (y) in Panel C.
Table 1: Summary of the data
ei = 40 ei = 10
(40, 10) (40, 40) (10, 10) (10, 40)
A. Investor’s behavior
Amount sent (X) 4.479 6.062 2.437 2.667
Standard Deviation 8.69 10.50 3.38 3.18
Min/Max 0/40 0/40 0/10 0/10
Proportion of zero sent 0.547 0.437 0.458 0.354
Observations 48 48 48 48
B. Allocator’s behavior
Proportion returned (y) 0.220 0.238 0.286 0.220
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.23
95% confidence interval (0.13, 0.31) (0.14, 0.33) (0.17, 0.40) (0.13, 0.30)
Min/Max 0/0.54 0/1 0/1 0/0.66
Proportion of zero returned 0.278 0.333 0.346 0.419
Observations 22 27 26 31
C. Correlation coe cient between X and y
Spearman (⇢) -0.030 -0.230 -0.070 -0.048
Kendall (⌧b) -0.039 -0.195 -0.056 -0.037
We observe in Panel A that the investor’s amount sent (X) increases with
10In Panel B, the number of observations di↵ers across treatments because allocators do not
always receive a positive transfer from allocators.
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her endowment but the proportion that is sent decreases with ei as already
suggested in Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005, 2008). We also see that investors
send less when the endowment of the allocator is lower. This complements
Johnson and Mislin (2011), where it is shown that the amount sent by investors
decreases when allocators are endowed. Our findings seem to indicate that
investors trust more when they are in a disadvantage position with regard to
the initial distribution of endowments, what suggests a kind of discontinuity
at a allocator endowment of zero. One plausible explanation for this behavior
is that trust is really ”altruism plus” as suggested by Cox (2004), but investors
perceive that it is riskier to send money when the allocator has a low level of
endowment compare with the case in which it is high.11
As for allocators, Panel B indicates that his behavior seems to be con-
sistent across distributions, with an average return between 22% and 28%.
When doing pairwise comparisons to test if allocators’ behavior varies within
distributions, we find that di↵erences are never significant using a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (see Table 1C in Appendix C). These findings seem to con-
tradict inequality aversion (or the equal-payo↵s hypothesis), which predicts
y40,10 < y10,40 -note that allocators return 22% of the available funds in both
distributions, with the proportion of zero returned being even higher in (10,
40), where y10,40 = 1 is expected if allocators were merely concerned about
equalizing final payo↵s. The 95% confidence interval seems to reject that
idea, with the confidence interval in (10, 40) being roughly the same as in (40,
11The idea in Cox (2004) is to compare investors’ giving when allocators are endowed and
when they are not so as to isolate the e↵ect of trust from the one of altruism. We note that ex-
perimental evidence on the relationship between risk attitudes and the investor’s behavior in the
investment game is mixed (e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2004, Schechter 2007, Ashraf et al. 2006). One
plausible explanation is that other factors di↵erent from risk (e.g., attitudes to betrayal) may
be at stake in the investment game (see Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004, Hong and Bohnet 2007,
Houser et al. 2010). An interesting finding along these lines is that investors are (slightly) more
likely to send nothing in the (40,10) distribution, compared with the (10, 40) distribution (test
of proportion: z = 1.847, p-value = 0.065, two-tailed). Investors may believe it is riskier to send
money to allocators who are at a disadvantage position because they would be more likely to be-
tray them.
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10).12,13 Further evidence against the equal-payo↵s hypothesis is obtained from
the correlation coe cients presented in Panel C, which measure the relation-
ship between the amount sent (X) and the proportion returned (y). These
correlations are never significant (p-values > 0.202), despite one might expect
a positive (and significant) correlation in the case of the distribution (40,10),
and a negative correlation in the (10, 40) distribution if allocators were con-
cerned about equalizing payo↵s.14
- Table 2 around here -
We perform an econometric analysis to confirm these findings. The results
are summarized in Table 2, which reports maximum-likelihood estimates of
three di↵erent random e↵ects specifications that control for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. The dependent variable in all the models refers to the
12In their asymmetric treatment, Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) find that allocators are less will-
ing to return than in the symmetric one, but di↵erences are not significant at the 5% level using
a two-sided Fisher test; i.e., in their (80,40) treatment, 7 of 22 allocators return nothing (14 of
23 did it in the treatment (40,40)). In our study, allocator’s willing to pay back is roughly the
same in distributions (10,10) and (40,10); where 9 of 27 and 6 of 22 allocators decided to return
nothing.
13When we only look at those allocators who decided to return a positive fraction of the avail-
able funds we also observe that allocators’ behavior is fairly consistent with the idea of reci-
procity (average proportion returned is 0.37, and median and mode equals 0.33).
14Some previous evidence in favor of reciprocity was based on finding a positive correlation be-
tween the amount that investors send and that allocator return, in absolute terms (e.g., Chaud-
huri and Gangadharan, 2007). As already noted in Berg et al. (1995) this is not a good measure
for reciprocity as the procedure ”will bias the correlation statistic upwards, i.e., low amounts
sent preclude some high returns” (page 131). Another possible measure for reciprocity is to con-
sider the correlation between the proportion sent and the proportion returned after applying a
logit transformation (see Johnson and Mislin, 2011). If we consider their transformation, the
Spearman’s correlation coe cient will be 0.530 in our (10,10) distribution (p-value = 0.06), what
would be consistent with their findings (our correlation would be negative in the rest of distri-
butions). For simplicity, we decided to use the same measure in Berg et al. (1995). Although we
get similar results, we do not interpret the absence of correlation as evidence against reciprocity
as we do not make any assumption on the allocator’s beliefs about the investors’ intentions when
sending X (see Cox 2004, Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000).
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proportion of the available funds that the allocator returns, y 2 [0, 1]. In
Model (1), the set of independent variables include the amount received (X),
the period in which the decision is made (Period), and the treatment condi-
tions, where the dummy variable Iei,ea that takes the value 1 if the distribution
of endowment is (ei, ea). Model (2) considers the same set of independent vari-
ables with the one exception of the amount received (X), which is now replaced
by the proportion of the endowment the investor sent (X/ei). Model (3) again
considers the amount received but controls for di↵erences in the endowments
by including a dummy variable IHIGHei that takes the value 1 when the in-
vestor is endowed with 40 tokens. This dummy is interacted with the amount
received by the allocator to see if there is any di↵erence in behavior depending
on whether the allocator receives the transfer from an investor with a high or
a low level of endowment. The reported standard errors (in brackets) take into
account matching group clustering.15
We observe that allocators tend to return a smaller proportion of the avail-
able funds with the period, which is a common pattern in other experiments
in which there is repetition (e.g., public good games). We also observe in
Models (1) and (2) that the amount or the proportion received do not a↵ect
allocators’ return. This is an interesting finding that is sometimes interpreted
as evidence against reciprocity. In our case, we look at the treatment condi-
tions to see whether reciprocity or inequality aversion can be reconciled with
our data. Recall that our baseline model relies on the (10,10) distribution of
endowments and predict no e↵ect of I40,40 (p-values > 0.563). Inequality aver-
sion, however, predicts a higher (smaller) return in I10,40 (I40,10), compared
with the baseline distribution. This does not seem to be the case as our esti-
mates for the treatment variables I10,40 and I40,10 are not statistically di↵erent
from zero (p-values > 0.156). In fact, the estimates for the treatment condi-
15We cluster at the group level to correct for standard errors, as suggested in Wooldridge
(2002). The results are robust if we control for demographics (gender, age and attitudinal trust),
which are never significant (see Table 2C in Appendix C). We note that the Breusch and Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier test supports the random-e↵ects specification, but our findings are also
robust to other specifications (e.g., if we cluster at the individual level or consider subject fixed-
e↵ects). These results are available upon request.
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tions I10,40 and I40,10 are statistically indistinguishable from each other at any
common significance level (Model (1):  21 = 0.33, p-value = 0.567; Model (2):
 21 = 0.03, p-value = 0.871). To further see that the investor’s endowment
does not a↵ect the allocator’s decision, we can see the estimate for the dummy
variable IHIGHei in Model (3). This is not statistically di↵erent from zero,
despite one would expect a negative e↵ect of ei = 40 when the allocator is
inequality averse (p-value = 0.435).
Overall, our results indicate that inequality aversion cannot be supported
by our data. The finding that endowments do not a↵ect the allocator’s de-
cision seems to align with the idea of reciprocity. An interesting question
concerns whether reciprocity receives further support. Recall that a minimum
requirement for reciprocity is that allocators return at least what they have
received from investors. The estimated constants in Table 2 are 0.351 and
0.388 and 0.371 for Models (1), (2) and (3), respectively. These are always sig-
nificant (p-values < 0.0001) so the hypothesis that allocators return the same
proportion of the available funds in all the distributions because they are be-
ing selfish can easily be rejected. We can test if reciprocity is also rejected by
looking at whether allocators give back the invested money (Bolle and Kaehler
2006, Johnson and Mislin 2011, Cooper and Kagel 2013). The null hypothesis
that the estimate for the constant equals 1/3 and the estimate for the amount
received equals 0 simultaneously (H0:  Constant = 1/3,  received(X) = 0) can-
not be rejected at any common significance level in the baseline distribution
(p-values > 0.456).16 As a result, we cannot reject the idea of reciprocity.
We note that our data can also be used to test inequality aversion within
each particular distribution, once we assume a particular utility function (i.e.,
a value of ↵). Overall, inequality aversion would predict a positive relation-
ship between the amount sent and the proportion returned in the (40,10)
distribution. Using model (3), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that H0:
 received(X) +  received(X)IHIGHei = 0) at any common significance level (p-
16The same holds when we test for reciprocal behavior in the rest of the distributions. The p-
values are always larger than 0.187 except when we test for reciprocity in the distribution (10,40)
in Models (1) and (2) (p-values = 0.095 and 0.061)
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value = 0.486). This, in turn, indicates that the amount received does not
a↵ect the allocators’ decision in the (40,10) distribution, in line with the cor-
relation coe cients in Table 1. One other plausible assumption is to consider
that allocators keep all what is generated because they want to restore strict
equality (see Ciriolo, 2007). If that were the case, allocators should the en-
tire available funds in the distribution (10,40). Using models (1) and (2), we
reject that hypothesis at any common significance level (p-value < 0.0001).
Along similar lines, we reject the null hypothesis that the constant equals
2/3 and the estimate for the amount received equals 0 simultaneously (H0:
 Constant = 2/3,  received(X) = 0) in both distributions (10,10) and (40,40)
using Models (1) and (2) (p-values < 0.0001). Thus, inequality aversion seems
to receive little support using our econometric analysis.
Next, we use an individual analysis and consider the best possible scenario
in which inequality aversion could be used to explain the data. The results
are summarized in Table 3. For any two distribution of endowments in which
inequality aversion predicts that allocators will behave di↵erently, we report
the number of allocators that behaved in the expected direction (the frequency
appears in brackets).
- Table 3 around here -
Overall, there are 91 situations in which the idea of inequality aversion
provides a clear-cut prediction. We observe that less than 40% of the times,
allocators behaved in the predicted direction (i.e., more than 60% of choices
were inconsistent with inequality-aversion). Using a binomial test, we reject
the hypothesis that majority of the choices went in the direction predicted by
inequality aversion (p-value < 0.018, one-sided).17
17Note that this is the best possible scenario for inequality aversion in that we do not impose
any value of ↵. In Appendix C, we use the assumption in Ciriolo (2007) to investigate within-
subject heterogeneity; i.e., we assume that allocators want to restore strict equality. We observe
that the majority of our subjects (roughly 57%) behave according to our definition of reciprocity,
whereas inequality-aversion receives little support from our data as less than 5% of subjects tend
to equalize final payo↵s (see Appendix C, Figure 3C).
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5 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to investigate whether allocators in the investment
game are motivated by reciprocity (i.e. returning what they have received), or
aversion to inequality (i.e., returning more to investors who were endowed with
a smaller endowment). We used the behavioral data in Calabuig et a. (2013)
to test these two contrasting behavioral motives using a within-subject design,
where subjects play the investment game with di↵erent level of endowments
that varied across rounds.
Our results suggest that allocators have a tendency to reciprocate investors’
behavior by sending a share of the available funds that is consistent across dis-
tributions. This finding, in turn, provides little evidence in favor of inequality
aversion in that allocators do not tend to return a larger (smaller) fraction
of the available funds if their endowment is larger (smaller) than that of the
investors. When we allow for individual heterogeneity, we observe that sub-
jects seldom exhibit a behavior that is consistent with inequality aversion,
whereas more than half of the allocators behave according to our definition of
reciprocity.
The assumption that subjects are willing to forego monetary payo↵s to
reduce inequality has served to explain and predict a large swath of observed
behavior in laboratory experiments. Although we may agree that inequality
aversion has some predictive power in di↵erent settings, our results provide
little evidence in that direction. One plausible explanation to rationalize our
findings is to consider that allocators do not held themselves responsible for the
initial distribution of endowments (which is exogenously determined) and thus
simply focus on what is available to be distributed when making their choices.
This, in turn, implies that allocators will focus on equalizing the distribution
of the available funds rather than taking care of equalizing final payo↵s.18
Our study is the not the first one in which inequality aversion is not sup-
ported by the data (e.g., Bereby-Meyer and Niederle 2005, Chowdhury and
18This is someone related to the accountability principle (Roemer 1998; Konow 1996) in the
theory of justice (see also the studies of Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010) for further discussion on
this topic).
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Jeon 2014, Filippin and Raimondi 2014). What is interesting, in our view, is
that inequality aversion is sometimes rejected when tested against other behav-
ioral motives such as e ciency (e.g., see Kritikos and Bolle 2001, Engelmann
and Strobel 2004 for the case of e ciency in the dictator game).
For the particular case of the investment game, we share the view ad-
vanced in Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2005) or Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) that
further research is needed to investigate subjects’ behavior when di↵erent mo-
tives underlying decision making are in conflict. We consider our paper to be
a contribution on these lines in that we test inequality aversion against the
possibility of allocators being reciprocal. In this sense, we believe, our results
enrich our understanding of the investment game by allowing us to test among
competing explanations. In our view, the recent paper of Cox et al. (2014) is
also an excellent step in that direction. We hope our results will provide the
impetus to further research in this area.
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Table 2. Random-effect estimates for the allocator’s behavior. 
 
Dependent variable: Proportion of the surplus returned (y) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
    
Constant 0.351*** 0.388*** 0.371*** 
 (0.055) (0.071) (0.077) 
Amount received (X) -0.002  -0.012 
 (0.002)  (0.008) 
Proportion received (X/ei)  -0.096  
  (0.063)  
Period -0.032** -0.034** -0.033** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) !!",!" -0.043 -0.046  
 (0.080) (0.079)  !!",!" -0.058 -0.090  
 (0.054) (0.063)  !!",!" 0.002 -0.033  
 (0.054) (0.054)  
I HIGH ei    -0.054 
   (0.070) 
Amount received x I HIGH ei   0.010 
   (0.008) 
    !! 0.147 0.137 0.149 !! 0.194 0.194 0.197 !  0.367 0.333 0.362 
    
R-squared 0.042 0.060 0.050 
Wald test 17.15*** 12.65** 12.46** 
Breusch and Pagan LM test 4.83** 4.75** 4.57** 
Observations 106 106 106 
    





Table 3. Frequency of choices that are consistent with the predictions of inequality aversion.  
 
 N Expected  Observed 
(10,10) vs (10,40) 17 !!",!" < !!",!"! 6 (35.29%) 
(10,10) vs (40,10) 14 !!",!" < !!",!"! 4 (28.57%) 
(10,40) vs (40,40) 17 !!",!" < !!",!"! 6 (35.29%) 
(40,10) vs (40,40) 13 !!",!" < !!",!" 8 (61.54%) 
(10,40) vs (40,10) 30 !!",!" < !!",!" 11 (36.67%) 






Recall that the investor and the allocator’s payoffs in the investment game in Berg et al. (1995) are given by:  
    (1) π!(!! , X, y) :=!!! !+ X (3y – 1) ≥ 0 
    (2) π!(!!, X, y) := !!!!+ 3X (1 – y) ≥ 0 
where !! !≥ 0 and !! ≥ 0 denote the investor (subject i) and the allocator’s (subject a) endowments, respectively, the value 
of X in [0,!!!] corresponds to the amount that the investor sends to the allocator, and y in [0,1] stands for the percentage 
of the available funds that the allocator decides to return.  
 
If we consider the assumption in Coleman (1990) and Ciriolo (2007), a minimum requirement for reciprocity is that the 
allocator returns at least one third of the available funds (! = 1/3), or otherwise the investor would be worse off than if 
she have sent nothing. As for inequality aversion, the allocator may want to equalize the final payoffs, so that the initial 
distribution of endowments may play a role in his decision (Ciriolo 2007, Xiao and Bicchieri 2010). To build upon this 
possibility, we can follow Ciriolo (2007) and impose equality of payoffs, π!(!! ,X,y) = π!(!!,X,y). If we solve for the 
allocator’s decision, we obtain the result that the allocator who wants to equalize payoffs should return a fraction of the 
available funds that takes into account both the amount that he receives from the investor and the level of endowments. 
Thus, we can define an allocator as inequality averse if he returns a proportion y  [0,1] of the available funds that satisfies: ! = !!!!!!!!! + !! . 
 
In the absence of endowment heterogeneity (i.e., when !! = !!!) the inequality-averse allocator will return 2/3 of the 
available funds. This is to keep the final distribution of payoffs equal, as it was the initial distribution of endowments. 
When the investor’s endowment is larger than the allocator’s one (i.e., !! > !!!), a higher X implies that the inequality-
averse allocator will return a larger share of the available funds. This is because for small values of X, the allocator will 
tend to keep the available funds and return nothing so as to reduce payoff inequalities.  
 
Next, we use an example to illustrate the predictions of the reciprocal and the inequality-averse allocator in each possible 
distribution of endowments. Recall that we use two level of endowments in our experiment, !! ∈ {10,40} for ! = !, !. 
Along the horizontal axis of Figure 1, we plot the investor’s decision X ∈ [0,!!!]. We use the vertical axis to represent the 
allocator’s decision, y ∈ [0,1]. Fig. 1a depicts the case of !! = 40 tokens. The reciprocal allocator should return y = 1/3, 
regardless of his endowment or the amount he received from the investor. If he is inequality averse, and endowments 
coincide (i.e., !! = 40), the amount received will play no role in the allocator’s decision either, and y = 2/3. However, 
when the initial distribution of endowments is in favor of the investor (i.e., !! = 10), inequality aversion predicts that the 
allocator will return nothing if he receives less than X = 7.5 tokens. As the allocator receives more money, he will return a 
larger fraction of the available funds, and will end up transferring y ≅ 0.54 if he receives 40 tokens (i.e., out of the 120 
tokens generated with the investor’s decision, the allocator keeps 55 tokens to be added to his initial endowment of 10 
tokens; and returns 65 tokens).  
 
The right-hand side panel of Fig 1A plots the case in which !! = 10. Again, the reciprocal allocator should return y=1/3 
and the inequality averse allocator y = 2/3 if endowments are equal (!! = 10). Now, the reciprocal allocator should 
return the entire available funds (y = 1) when the initial distribution of endowments is in his favor (!! = 40) so as to 
minimize payoff differences.1  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Note that for any amount X ∈ [0,10] that the allocator receives, inequality aversion predicts a return y > 1. This is not possible in our 
framework, as the allocator cannot transfer part of his own endowment to the investor. In the model of Ciriolo (2007), allocators are 
allowed to do so, and equality of payoffs is considered as a sufficient condition for reciprocity.  
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Our aim is not to study whether reciprocity or inequality aversion can explain behavior within particular distribution of 
endowments, but the extent to which both two behavioral motives can be reconciled with our data when we change the 
distribution of endowments. In that regard, reciprocity predicts that changing the endowments will not affect the 
allocator’s choices, whereas inequality aversion predicts higher returns in (10,40) compared with (40,10).  
 
One aspect that is worth mentioning is that our definition of reciprocity implies not only that the return will be consistent 
across treatments but also that allocators will return one third of the available funds regardless of the distribution of 
endowments. Importantly, our models of reciprocity and inequality aversion predict no relationship between the 
allocator’s return (y) and the amount received from investors (X), except in the distribution (40,10), where a positive 
relationship between X and y is expected if allocators are inequality averse (especially when the allocator receives more 
than 7.5 tokens) (see Figure 1A). This is because we are considering the (extreme) assumption that allocators want to 
restore equality of payoffs if they are inequality averse; i.e., π!(!! ,X,y) = π!(!!,X,y) should be satisfied for the allocator to 
be considered as inequality averse.  
 
Arguably, we can assume that allocators dislike payoff differences but not as much as to equalize payoffs. We can then 
consider that allocators, if inequality-averse, choose to return a proportion of the available funds so as to maximize:  
 
Max{y}  π!(!! , X, y) – !! !π!(!! ,X, y) !− !π!(!! ,X, y) ! 
 
In this case, the optimal decision for the allocator if inequality averse will depend not only on the received amount (X) 
and the level of endowments, but also on the value of !, as follows:  ! = !!! − !!!6! !+ !23 !− 112!!!! 
 
Figure 2A shows the allocator’s decision depending on the particular value of !  for each possible distribution of 
endowments separately.2 An arrow indicates how the predictions change when the allocator is more adverse to inequality 
(i.e., when we increase the value of !). We observe that optimal choices tend to the ones represented in Figure 1A when 
the value of ! is sufficiently large so that the allocator wants to restore strict equality (red lines).   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 We do not show the predictions in (10, 10) because these are similar to the ones in (40, 40) as in both cases!!! = !!! . 
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We observe in Figure 2A that inequality aversion predicts a positive correlation between the amount sent and the 
proportion of the available surplus returned in the distribution (40, 10).  It is also the case in the absence of endowment 
heterogeneity (i.e., when !! = !!!), although choices collapse to an optimal return of 2/3 of the available funds when we 
increase ! (i.e., when the allocator is sufficiently inequality averse then he will return 2/3, regardless of what he has 
received). Similarly, inequality aversion predicts a positive correlation between amount sent and proportion returned in 
(10, 40), except for the case in which the inequality-averse allocator wants to restore strict equality. In that case, he should 





Appendix B: Instructions  
 
This is a translated version of the original instructions in Calabuig et al. (2013). Their experiment consisted of 
8 rounds, divided into 2 blocks of 4 rounds. These instructions explain how the experiment proceeded for 
the first 4 rounds (block 1, without punishment). Subjects were then provided new instructions for the 
second block (with punishment). There were additional sessions, in which the first block consisted of the 
treatment with punishment. 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
This is an experiment to study decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully 
you will get an amount of money in cash at the end of the experiment in a confidential manner. All through 
the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will 
ever know your particular choices or the amount of money that you get. Talking is forbidden during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended as soon as 
possible. 
 
In this experiment there are two types of players: A and B. Before starting the experiment, you will be 
randomly selected either as player A or player B and this type will be kept all through experiment.     
In each round, you will be matched with one of the subjects of the other type (i.e., you will be matched with a 
player B if you are player A, and you will be marched with a player A if you are player B). In this block, you 
will never be matched with the same person twice (i.e., you will take decisions with a different person in each 
round). 
 
At the beginning of each round, you will get an amount of ECUs that can be either 10 or 40. The amount 
that you get does not need to coincide with the amount of ECUs received by the other player you are 
matched with, although you will always know both amounts before taking your decision. 
 
If you are player A, you have to decide the amount of ECUs (if any) to send to player B. The amount of 
ECUs that you send will be deducted from your initial ECUs and will be triplicated (i.e., we will multiply this 
amount by 3). The amount of ECUs that you don’t send to player B will be yours. 
If you are player B, you will get three-times the amount of ECUs that player A sent you. After you know this 
amount, you have to decide the amount of ECUs (in any) that you want to return to player A. You will keep 
the ECUs that you do not send to player A plus your initial ECUs. 
 
So, in this block, your gains in each round depend of your decisions in the following way: 
Final payoff player A = Initial ECU of A – ECU sent to B + ECUs received from B 
Final payoff player B = Initial ECU of B + 3* ECU received from A - ECU sent to A 
 
To check that you have understood the instructions, we ask you to look at the computer screen. First, you 
will see the logic of the experiment through a numerical example. Next, you will need to compute the final 
payoffs of an example in which in which the computer chooses numbers randomly the ECUs send by player 




In what follows, we present the original screenshots of the experiment (in Spanish), both for the investor and 
for the allocator’s decision. The translation for each screenshot is presented in the text below.   
 






















Investors were informed on this screen: “In this round you have 40 ECUS. The player you are matched with has 40 
ECUS”. Then, investors had to “Indicate the amount of ECUs to send to player B (the amount must be between 0 and 
40)”. Investors chose the desired transfer using the blue box. The text below the box reminds subjects that “the amount 
that you send will be reduced from your initial ECUs and multiplied by the 3” 
 






















Investors were informed on this screen about the initial endowments (as explained for the case of investors). In the third 
line, the text states: “Player A sent you 5 ECUs, therefore you have received 15 ECUs. Indicate the amount that you want 
to send to player A (the amount must be between 0 and 15)”.  
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Matching protocol 
 
We recruited a total of 96 subjects, which interacted with each other using a perfect-stranger protocol (i.e., subjects ). This 
was implemented in our experiment using matching group. Each session consisted of 24 subjects, which were divided 
into 3 groups of 8 subjects. In each groups, 4 subjects were assigned the role of investors and 4 subjects the role of 
allocators –the roles are kept constant through the experiment. To explain the matching protocol, consider that investors 
in Group 1 are denoted (!!!, !!!, !!!, !!!), and allocators (!!!, !!! , !!! ,!!!). In Group 2, investors are (!!!, !!!, !!!, !!!), and 
allocators (!!!, !!!, !!!,!!!), etc…  
The experimental protocol is such that in every round, subjects are matched with other members in their group, but 
subjects of different groups never interact with each other through the session.  For example, in round 1, investor !!! is 
matched with allocator !!! , !!! is matched with !!! , !!! is matched with !!!  and !!! is matched with !!! ,…!In round 2, 
investor !!! is matched with allocator !!! , investor !!! is matched with allocator !!! , … In round 3, investor !!! is matched 






 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
And this is true for every possible group what implies that an investor in any Group g (say !!!) will never meet an 
allocator from a different group (say !!! for ! ≠ g).  
Although subjects were not aware of the details of this matching protocol, the experiment instructions were read aloud 
and made clear that they would “never interact with the same subject twice” across the 4 different rounds. This is a 
possible way to implement a “perfect-stranger protocol”, in the sense that subjects were ensured to meet a different 
subject (i.e., an “stranger”) in each round. One important advantage of our design is that it allows us to balance and 
control for the order in which distributions of endowments were implemented. Note that investor !!! is matched with 
allocator !!! in round 1. Suppose that they both played the distribution (10,10). Further assume that subjects !!! and !!! 
played the distribution (10,40), !!! and !!! played (40,10) and !!! and !!! played the distribution (40,40). In the second 
round, investor !!!  is matched with a new allocator !!! , as indicated above. Because they had already played the 
distributions (10,10) and (10,40), the matching protocol is such that the distribution (40,40) was chosen for them in 
Round 2. This procedure can be applied for each pair and group so that at the end of the four rounds each player goes 
through the four distributions, with different orders, as detailed below (superscript for groups are omitted for simplicity): 
Distribution: (10, 10) (10, 40) (40, 10) (40, 40) 
Round 1: I1 – A1 I2 – A2 I3 – A3 I4 – A4 
Round 2: I2 – A3 I3 – A4 I4 – A1 I1 – A2 
Round 3: I4 – A2 I1 – A3 I2 – A4 I3 – A1 
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In Figure 1C, we present the histogram for the proportion of the available funds the allocator returns in each distribution 
separately. We then compare the allocator’s behavior across distributions using a non-parametric analysis in Table 1C.  
 
















Table 1C. Non-parametric analysis to test the allocator’s behavior across distributions. We perform a Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test for the null hypothesis that the allocator’s behavior is the same in any two distributions.3 We report 
the value of the statistic and the p-value (in brackets), which are not corrected for multiple testing (i.e., we should expect 
higher p-values if we undertake the Bonferroni correction). 
 





(0.462) !!",!"  1.607 (0.108) 0.523 (0.601) !!",!"   -0.629 (0.529) 
 
Recall that our hypotheses are such that:  
RECIPROCITY.    !!",!" = !!",!" = !!",!" = !!",!" 
INEQUALITY-AVERSION.  !!",!" < !!",!" = !!",!" < !!",!". 
 





3 Because allocators can only return money if they have received it, when we compare two distributions we only consider those allocators 
who received money in both of them. This is why the number of observations varies across comparisons. The minimum sample size (13 
observations) is when we compare distributions (40,10) and (10,40), and the maximum (30 observations) when we compare (40,10) and 
(10,40). 
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Figure 2C. Observed behavior in each distribution of endowments and theoretical predictions. Recall that we want to see 
if allocators’ behavior is compatible with our idea of reciprocity (Coleman 1990, Ciriolo 2007) or rather with inequality 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Figure 2C depicts the theoretical prediction of both 
models, together with the observed behavior in each of the four distributions. In the upper (lower) panel, we present the 
predictions and the allocators’ behavior for the case in which !! = 40 (!! = 10). For reciprocity, recall that allocators 
should return (at least) 1/3 of the available funds, so that investors get to receive (at least) what they have sent. As for 
inequality aversion, we depict the predictions when assuming that allocators want to restore strict equality of payoffs 
(Ciriolo 2007). The interested reader can see how these predictions may vary depending on the allocator’s taste for strict-




For the data to support the idea of inequity aversion, we should observe !!",!" < !!",!". Graphically, it does not seem to 
be the case. On the distribution (40,10) some allocators behave according to inequity aversion when receive 40 tokens, 
but allocators who received 40 tokens in the distribution (40,40) tend to return y < 0.2 of the available funds, when they 
should return y = 2/3 if they were motivated by equalizing payoffs. Inequality aversion does not seem to predict behavior 
for distributions in the lower panels either. Recall that inequality predicts !!",!" < !!",!" but again we fail to observe this 
behavioral pattern. In fact, we observe that !!",!"= 1 in some cases, whereas !!",!" never takes the value 1, contrary to 
what equality predicts (in fact, it is always the case that y < 0.7). Overall, we observe that allocators’ behavior seem to be 
consistent across distributions. This is also clear from Panel B of Table 1 in the main text, where we showed that average 
return varied between 22% and 28% (see Figure 3C for within-subject heterogeneity and Table 2 for the number of 





Table 2C. Econometric analysis (random-effect models) controlling for demographics. Below, we replicate the analysis in 
Table 2 in the main text and show that our results are robust if we control for demographics.  
 
Dependent variable: Proportion of the available funds returned (y) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
    
Constant 0.167 0.223 0.210 
 (0.189) (0.168) (0.158) 
Amount received (X) -0.002  -0.010 
 (0.002)  (0.008) 
Proportion received (X/ei)  -0.090  
  (0.062)  
Period -0.032* -0.034** -0.033** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) !!",!" -0.042 -0.049  
 (0.080) (0.080)  !!",!" -0.059 -0.090  
 (0.056) (0.065)  !!",!" 0.008 -0.026  
 (0.050) (0.057)  
I HIGH ei    -0.042 
   (0.065) 
Amount received x I HIGH ei   0.008 
   (0.007) 
Gender (=1 female) 0.054 0.050 0.041 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) 
Age 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Trust (GSS) -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.158) 
    !! 0.154 0.146 0.158 !! 0.194 0.194 0.197 !  0.387 0.364 0.391 
    
R-squared 0.069 0.076 0.068 
Wald test 39.33*** 15.53** 40.45** 
Observations 106 106 106 
    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by groups. The independent variable Trust (GSS) 
correspond to the answer in the attitudinal survey question from the General Social Survey: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be careful in dealing with 
people?” (=1 if most people can be trusted). Significance at the *** 1%, ** 5%, or *10% level. 
 
 
We observe that differences in endowments do not affect the allocator’s behavior. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the allocator’s behavior in !!",!" is the same as their behavior in !!",!" at any common significance level (p-value = 
0.519). The null hypothesis that the proportion of the available funds returned is equal to 1/3 cannot be rejected in any of 
the distributions (p-vales > 0.395), therefore we find evidence for reciprocity. The idea of inequality aversion is, however, 
rejected. For example, in Model (1) we do not see that the amount received affect the allocators’ decision in the 
distribution (10, 10) or (40, 40). Further, if we assume that allocators would want to restore strict equality, we can reject 
that their return is equal to 2/3 in the absence of endowment heterogeneity in this model (p-values < 0.05). We can also 







Figure 3C. Analysis for reciprocity and inequality aversion when considering heterogeneity across subjects.4  Figure 3C 
depicts the percentage and the frequency of decisions taken according to three different behavioral patterns we may 
consider: 
• Selfish behavior. Allocators keep the available funds and transfer, y = 0. 
• Reciprocity. Allocators return what they have received from investors, y = 1/3. 
• Inequality-aversion. Allocators return a proportion of the available funds that depend on the level of endowments 
and what they received from investors so as to equalize payoffs, ! = !!!!!!!!! !+ !!!!!(see Appendix A).   
 
We classify choices using the minimum distance to each of the three behavioral motives.5  As for subjects, we consider 
what each allocator returns in the different distribution of endowments, and compute deviations to each prediction using 
the mean square error criteria.  
!
 
A first thing to notice is that the large majority of choices (more than 90%) are either purely selfish or can be classified 
using our definition of reciprocity, both behavioral motives being equally important in explaining allocators’ choices (less 
than 10% of choices are classified according to our definition of inequality aversion). At the subject level, the results also 
seem to be conclusive. Less than 5% of allocators make choices that are better explained by inequality than by selfish or 
reciprocal behavior. These two behavioral motives are best reconciled with our data (especially reciprocity, which is 
compatible with the observed choices of roughly 57% of subjects). Overall, these findings are in line with our results 




4 A similar approach has been undertaken in other studies. For example, Cappelen et al. (2007) examine the prevalence of different 
justice ideals in a dictator game with production. They find (using structural estimations) that there is substantial heterogeneity within 
individuals, what suggest that behavior cannot be explained by a unique justice principle. 
5 When a choice can be explained by two principles, we select one of them at random. For instance, a return of y = 0.165 in the 
distribution (10,40) can be explained by reciprocity and also by selfish behavior –the distance to both principles is the same. We select 
one of the two principles randomly, and assume that the choice is guided by either reciprocity or selfish behavior. The proportion of 
overlaps is very small, about 6 percent of all decisions. !
